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A Different Departure: A Reply to Shany’s
“Redrawing Maps, Manipulating
Demographics: On Exchange of Populated
Territories and Self-Determination”∗
Timothy William Waters
Abstract
Anyone reading Yuval Shany’s response to my article, “The Blessing of Departure—Exchange
of Populated Territories The Lieberman Plan as an Abstract Exercise in Demographic Transfor-
mation,” would hardly characterize it as “agreement.” In part this is because Shany builds his case
by assuming I am saying something about self-determination that misses—at least misplaces—my
real point. This is unfortunate, both as it masks the fact that Shany and I actually agree transfers
can be legal, and it distracts attention from the points of real, substantive disagreement. The mis-
reading is not an accident, rather the product of a patterned view. The points of disagreement,
center on: whether transfer is a harm per se; whether the presence of a minority affects the state’s
power to transfer; whether there is a positive right not to be denationalized; and whether there is a
hierarchy of rights.
∗Sincere thanks to Prof. Yuval Shany, whose thoughtful response prompted this reply, and Rachel
Guglielmo. Comments to tiwaters@indiana.edu.
A DIFFERENT DEPARTURE:
A REPLY TO SHANY’S “REDRAWING MAPS, 
MANIPULATING DEMOGRAPHICS:
ON EXCHANGE OF POPULATED TERRITORIES 
AND SELF-DETERMINATION”
Timothy William Waters*
I. A DIFFERENT READING
Halfway into his excellent and forceful response, it turns out  Yuval 
Shany agrees with me: “This does not mean, however, that the State 
of Israel cannot cede land or even, in theory, denationalize part of its 
citizenry…. [T]he legality of such moves would need to be grounded 
in the state’s general sovereign powers.”1 So states can transfer 
territory and denationalize citizens, consistent with human rights: this 
is, almost exactly, my argument too.
Still, anyone reading Shany’s response would hardly characterize 
it as “agreement.” In part this is because Shany builds his case by 
assuming I am saying something about self-determination that 
misses—at least misplaces—my real point.  This is unfortunate, both 
as it masks the fact that Shany and I actually agree transfers can be 
legal, and it distracts attention from the points of real, substantive 
disagreement.  I will say something later about this misreading—not 
an accident, rather the product of a patterned view—but I think it better 
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).  
Sincere thanks to Prof. Yuval Shany, whose thoughtful response prompted this 
reply, and Rachel Guglielmo.  Comments to tiwaters@indiana.edu.
1 Yuval Shany, Redrawing Maps, Manipulating Demographics: On Exchange 
of Populated Territories and Self-Determination, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS 286, 301 
(2008) (and 303, using similar language in conclusion).
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to address the points of disagreement, which center on these things:
• whether transfer is a harm per se; 
• whether the presence of a minority affects the state’s 
power to transfer;
• whether there is a positive right not to be 
denationalized; and
• whether there is a hierarchy of rights.
These are questions about how to characterize doctrine, but they 
also reveal different normative commitments concerning citizenship 
and states, and—considered together with our real disagreement 
about self-determination—say something troubling about what, for 
convenience, we may call “cosmopolitanism.”
II. DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES:
FOUR OBJECTIONS, ONE ASSUMPTION
Our agreement is limited.  Even though he acknowledges that transfers 
are possible (a view already beyond what some scholars admit), Shany 
thinks this transfer—the Lieberman Plan—is clearly illegal.  Some of his 
reasons are anticipated, and answered, in my article,2 so here I consider 
only certain objections that indicate a deeper divergence: These include 
the real risk doctrine, the right of option, and the claim that I construct 
an impermissible hierarchy with sovereign control of territory trumping 
rights.  These objections fail, but more importantly, the ways in which 
they fail share a common defect: an assumption that a state polity has an 
essential, even moral, integrity.
2 Shany lists rights that transfer violates, but I show that, because these rights gain 
content through membership in a polity (which is grounded in affinities arising from
residence in a particular place), a transfer of territory also transfers to the new sovereign 
responsibility for those rights.  Likewise, he claims the Plan’s discriminatory raison 
d’être disqualifies it, but I show how states in fact have broad latitude to circumvent
this demonstrably porous prohibition, as the Plan does by targeting territory in the 
name of preserving (Jewish) democracy.
2
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A. REAL RISK, BUT TO WHAT?
Shany and I agree that states normally have the right to transfer 
territory and denationalize citizens.  A human rights claim would 
trump that—Shany and I agree on this too—but only if the state’s 
action would constitute a violation.  So, would it?
Saying yes, Shany invokes the “real risk” doctrine: Transfer is 
invalid because it creates a real risk that transferees’ human rights would 
be violated.  Citizens of wealthy, rights-respecting Israel would join 
impoverished, violent Palestine: Health care would decline, repression 
increase.3  Shany’s objection relies on current levels of rights in the West 
Bank, but nothing in the Plan—or the idea of transfer—requires us to 
assume that any individual will necessarily be subjected to treatment 
that in the absence of transfer would constitute a violation.  Even if the 
doctrine barred placing individuals in worse situations, that would still 
allow a broad category of transfers: It would be interesting to consider 
Shany’s response if Lieberman proposed transferring Umm el Fahm to, 
say, Norway.  Real risk doctrine might prohibit a particular transfer, but 
it is wholly inapposite to analyzing changes in sovereignty as a general 
category; it is not a bar to this kind of thing.
But this presents a problem for Shany, since he also says that the 
Arabs’ loss of Israeli citizenship and community with other Israelis 
violates their human rights.  Indeed, it seems clear that Shany’s real 
objection is not to the harmful loss of health services or education, but 
to the transfer itself, which severs common bonds of citizenship and 
identity.  That kind of harm springs not from any discrete violation 
by or shortcoming of the receiving sovereign—which is what real 
risk doctrine normally contemplates4—but as a function of transfer 
3 Not to mention that, of course, transferees would also be subjected to an illegal 
occupation.
4 Real risk doctrine has been applied almost exclusively to cases of extradition 
or deportation in which individuals faced specific harm, such as torture, or suffered
a specific medical condition requiring treatment.  It has never been applied to a
generalized denationalization resulting from a transfer of sovereignty.
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itself.  If he is right, transfer causes an absolute harm by the very act 
of changing borders. 
This argument proves too much: If it were right, there could never 
be a legitimate transfer, since all transfers break existing political 
communities.  But transfer is possible– we agree on that—and in the 
postwar era many states have formed from other, existing states without 
anyone suggesting that their varying ability to realize progressive 
human rights—or their sundering of existing political communities5—
constituted a violation of human rights.6
Some transfers may harm individuals, and sometimes that harm 
may violate human rights.  But the only things all transfers do are 
move borders and change citizenship; the real risk of transfer is to the 
integrity of an existing political community.
B. CONSTRUCTING MINORITY STATUS:
There is something curious in the attempt to elevate the bare fact 
of common citizenship—itself a function of where borders happen 
to be— into an absolute bar against changing those borders.  This 
is especially clear, and troubling, if we consider the weight placed 
5 Citizens have the right to travel about, and live within, their state.  But Shany’s 
claim that transfer violates this right is at odds with state practice: Slovenes can no 
longer move to Belgrade, or Belarusians to Samarkand—and nobody frames this as a 
“violation.”  When the territory of a state changes, the scope of mobility changes too. 
It cannot be—as a logical matter or a legal one—that the right to move within a state 
determines the shape of that state: the right is coextensive with the state’s territory 
whatever it happens to be.
6 Some examples: partition of British India; withdrawal of Singapore from 
Malaysia; independence of Algeria; independence of East Pakistan; dissolutions of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; division of Czechoslovakia; separation of Eritrea 
and Ethiopia.  For Shany, dissolution is inapposite, since “the creation of new states… 
do[es] not involve denationalization.”  (Shany, supra note 1, at 307).  This is doctrinal 
formalism: While it is notionally possible for a state’s authority to dissolve, following 
a plague or natural disaster, say, in the actual cases we call dissolution, there was no 
precipitating collapse, rather the act of secession itself signaled dissolution.
4
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on protecting the Arabs’ minority status.  Shany argues that transfer 
would break this minority into two groups, violating the rights both 
of those cut off from Israel and those left behind in it.  But the Israeli 
Arab minority is not some autochthonous, primordial organism; it is, 
in the first instance, a construct of the Israeli frontier.  Arabs on one
side are members of the minority, those on the other subjects of the 
occupation—and claimants to Palestinian statehood.  With different 
borders, Israel’s Arab minority might be its majority;7 with different 
borders, any given member of that minority might be, well, just another 
Arab in the West Bank.  The difference is the border.8 
Where a group exists, definitionally, because of a border, I do not
think there is doctrinal or even logical support for the proposition that 
the group’s rights are violated by that border’s revision.9  Minority 
status is a residual and remedial category; no one affirmatively wishes
to be a minority for its own sake.  So it is curious to construct that status 
as something absolute that shapes the state rather than being shaped 
by the state, indeed made necessary by it.  Still, that he maintains 
otherwise, positing an essential, irreducible identity for Arabs qua 
minority—and it is worth remembering, a minority in relation to 
7 Transfer does destroy Arabs’ minority status—by making them members of 
the neighboring state’s majority. Would we reject a single state in Cisjordan on the 
grounds that it would destroy Israeli Arabs’ minority identity?
8 This is not to deny difference and complexity within Cisjordanian Arab-
Palestinian society, nor the common frames of reference Israeli Arabs uniquely share 
after 60 years.  See, e.g., Ali Haider, Arabs Here to Stay: ‘Population Exchange Notion 
Leaves Arab-Israelis No Choice but to Seek World’s Help, YNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 24, 
2007, available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3441007,00.html (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2007) (“the Arab population in Israel is one national group whose 
social and cultural formulation since 1948 enjoys collective aspects”).  But neither 
should we deny other frames of reference, nor the decisive role of borders in defining
and maintaining categories of difference.
9 I know of no border revision or new state rejected on the grounds that it changed the 
composition of a minority.  A similar proposition was rejected by the Badinter Commission, 
which did not view divisions introduced among Yugoslavia’s ethnicities as an obstacle to 
formation of new states, thoughit did require those new states to respect minority rights. 
Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion 2, 31 I.L.M. 1497 (1992).
5
Waters: A Different Departure
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
what?—suggests how central the defense of a common polity is for 
Shany.  And he proposes other means to defend it.
C. A RIGHT OF OPTION?
Arguments about the irrelevance of rights would fail if there were 
a positive right to retain one’s citizenship.  And Shany says there is: a 
“right of option” that allows affected populations to choose between 
citizenship in the new state or the old.
Here again, state practice suggests there is no such right: Among 
all the examples noted before of states that were newly constituted or 
changed their frontiers, none accorded an option—and no one described 
those as human rights violations.  Indeed, examining Shany’s argument, 
the evidence is thin—two agreements allowing ex gratia retention of 
citizenship10—and the principal engine for his claim is bare preference: 
This is a good thing that he feels ought to be a law.  And while this might 
be a good and generous thing—after all, who does not want options?—
we must acknowledge a corollary: Granting an option to the Arabs in 
effect denies the “option of departure” for the Jews—departure, that is, 
not in a physical sense, but from the project of a community.  A right of 
option is a veto on changing the polity; it constructs citizenship as an 
almost indissoluble—indeed, inescapable—category.
D. WHOSE HIERARCHY? 
So who gets an option: the state or its people?  Supposedly, I 
create a hierarchy with “human rights…subordinated to the political 
configuration of the state, which is, in turn, governed by the right to self-
determination.”11  But this in no way follows from my argument, which is 
about the scope of rights.  A transfer that violated human rights would be 
void—but no right is implicated.  Certain rights are instantiated through 
10 Neither agreement—the 2000 Treaty of Jeddah nor the ICJ ruling in 
Bakassi—suggests any obligation to grant an option.
11 Shany, supra note 1, at 303.
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the state—they acquire specific form through application in a specific
state.  This does not imply subordination—though it does suggest what 
my argument indeed says: that human rights do not speak to changes in 
sovereign control over territory.  They are silent on this question.
It may jar one’s cosmopolitan sensibilities to think that human 
rights—which aim to pierce the fetish-veil of sovereignty—might have 
little to say about such an important issue as transfer of sovereignty, and 
I hardly expect this brief reply to sway any minds not convinced by the 
full paper.  One’s disposition towards the uncomfortable but important 
idea that universal human rights often gain meaning in particular social 
contexts largely determines one’s receptivity to this kind of argument. 
Such arguments cannot be won, only described and motivated.  But I 
will have more to say about that disposition in the final section.
One more thing this question of “option” suggests: because it would 
deny individuals the means to reconstitute their polity, it is in effect 
the right of option that would create a hierarchy—but one that places 
at its apex the citizenry as a totality—which is to say, the state.
III. FLUX AND CONVERGENCE:
SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY DOES
WHAT SELF-DETERMINATION DOESN’T
I should now address that distracting misinterpretation I mentioned. 
Shany assumes I am making a kind of straight-line attack to show 
that self-determination affords a right of ethnic secession from 
existing states.  I am not, because, just like Shany, I do not think it 
does.  I completely agree that the lex lata—which one could look up in 
Brownlie12 or Higgins13 or Cassese14—does not allow ethnic secession. 
12 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 490 (6th ed. 2003)
13 Rosalyn Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession: Comments, 
in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30, 32 (Catherine Broelmann et al., 
ed., 1993)
14 ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 334 
(1995).
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Were I writing a different paper, I would cite Shany as a compact and 
efficient treatment of this fairly obvious truth.
But my argument is built on something entirely different—
something with which Shany agrees: the broad powers democratic 
majorities have in sovereign states to alter their borders and reconstitute 
their citizenship. This is not self-determination: I state clearly that 
this process, if described as self-determination, is not supported by 
international law.  Indeed, if I am right that all his other objections fail, 
then the only way left for Shany to object to the Plan is precisely to 
characterize it as an improper act of self-determination.
And this is where, I suspect, the most profound disagreement Shany 
and I have arises—the thing motivating his peculiar misreading: that 
a democratic majority altering Israel’s borders would look curiously 
like the outcome if one applied classical self-determination; that this 
functional convergence is not an accident; and that we might need to 
take this seriously.
Whenever two distinct doctrinal approaches—one compatible 
with existing norms, the other contravening them—lead to one 
outcome, we find ourselves at a moment of flux, of opportunity:
the doctrines’ functional equivalence suggests their fungibility, and 
thus a moment for re-evaluation.  In this case, two doctrines present 
themselves: a sovereign majoritarian transfer of territory, and an act 
of self-determination.  One is consistent with current norms, the other 
heterodox, yet they lead to an identical outcome.  A candid observer 
must admit that the logic of self-determination more meaningfully 
represents the motives of the actors: Sovereign majoritarianism 
describes a process, but does not supply meaning; it tells us nothing 
about why a population might choose to organize itself in a certain 
way, which is precisely what self-determination does tell us.
What I argue, in other words, is that while current self-determination 
rules bar reconstitution of states, that proscription rests on a doctrinally 
unstable basis, is inconsistent with our other normative commitments, 
and vitiates efforts to motivate democratic outcomes; in the harsh 
circumstances of Cisjordan, it may be bad policy to boot.  So I indeed 
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conclude that self-determination—the secession of Israel’s Jews—
could prove normatively defensible (and if it could, it would seem 
strange to limit self-determination to groups that happen to be electoral 
majorities in current state borders).  But that it is not “supported by 
positive international law”15 today: Shany and I agree on that.  It is not 
law—despite this compelling convergence—precisely because of the 
kind of commitment Shany’s argument represents: commitment to a 
curiously strident cosmopolitanism.
IV. COSMOPOLITAN DEPARTURES
Shany follows, indeed represents, one of the best and most humane 
traditions in Israeli thinking, and so what there is of criticism here 
arises because we speak, not so much of a particular man’s view, but 
of a way of thinking like his.  And precisely because it is a humane 
tradition, it is all the more troubling to observe its descent into 
formalism, its deformation away from the unmediated embrace of the 
human and towards something else.
Shany does not deny that groups within the state experience 
strains, but believes they “should negotiate some inter-communal 
modus vivendi (or a friendly divorce), or strive to create a new civic 
identity, which transcends ethnic lines.”16  The problem, of course, 
is all those unhappy marriages where no divorce is possible.  In the 
real world, majorities seldom let minorities leave; why should they, 
when—precisely because of the democratic process—they hold the 
dominant position?  When the party holding the power, resources 
and a voting majority feels disinclined to divorce, under the existing 
doctrinal framework there is no recourse at all.  This does not seem 
like any better a policy for communities than for couples.
But the practical impossibility of divorce is evidently irrelevant—
what matters far more is defense of a polity committed to (at least 
acquiescent in) the project of co-existence. There is an element of 
15 Id. at 10.
16 Id. at 11.
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formalism, even fantasy, in the policy arguments underpinning this 
commitment.  Consider this key defense of the existing state as the 
final vessel of national aspiration:
[T]he “locking in” of different groups within a single 
polity provides the State with relative permanence and 
stability and conveys to the different ethnic groups 
within the State the idea that, from an international 
perspective, they share a single national identity and, 
perhaps, a common destiny.17
Quite apart from one’s preferences, does this descriptively, 
empirically satisfy?  Does anyone think that Arabs and Jews actually 
share a “single national identity”?18  If they did, there would be 
little debate about the “problem” of keeping Israel democratic and 
Jewish. As for stability—the great contribution of international law’s 
conservatism, Shany tells us—well: I have never heard that word 
applied to the land west of the Jordan.
The idea of creating a transcendent, civic identity assumes the 
irrelevance, even undesirability, of ethnic identity, and we should at 
least admit that this is a difficult claim to make in the face of real
human beings who disagree.  Leaving this aside, creating a civic 
identity is problematic enough in a state organized on secular lines, 
but Israel is an expressly Jewish project, which begs the question of 
which group has to do the transcending.
From the beginning, the creation of Israel has also been a project 
of exclusion, actual and definitional.  Israel has offered citizenship
to all within its borders, but made discretionary choices about who, 
precisely, is allowed within them.  To this day Israel has not fixed
its frontiers (as for their part Palestinians have never recognized the 
17 Id. at 11.
18 The infixation “perhaps” suggests Shany cannot bring himself to say Arabs and
Jews have “a common destiny”’
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borders, or existence, of Israel); Cisjordan is a contested land, not one 
whose constitutional moment is past.
What is occurring today in Cisjordan is a process of division. 
The principle of two states—and their inevitability—has been 
conceded; we are only haggling about borders.  A place of division is 
unpromising and quixotic ground on which to prove a cosmopolitan 
claim; I think this is why the attempt turns to abstraction as the only 
way to sustain its insistence on common identity.  Shany defends 
orthodox self-determination because it “simplifies the difficult task
of identifying the ‘people’” and “circumvents the ‘minority within a 
minority’ conundrum.”19  But self-identified communities—and the
“conundrums” they create—do not go away just because we declare 
that their state defines their aspirations.
“Locking in” works—except where it doesn’t.  Unfortunately, 
“doesn’t” covers a great many places for which our present doctrine 
has no answer; worse, though it springs from humane and cosmopolitan 
impulses, it provides inapposite, distracting answers positively 
harmful to other liberal values.  Nowhere do we find consideration—I
am not speaking of sympathy—for the fact that not “giving up on 
co-existence”20 does not merely call individuals to higher ideals, but 
requires them to do what they do not wish to do.  He speaks of options, 
but Shany is compelling these communities to stay together.  What 
exactly is the rationale for that?  The Arabs may not want to leave,21 
but Lieberman does—is his only option emigration?22
19 Shany, supra note 1, at 292.
20 Id. at 299.
21 What would happen if Israel’s Arabs demanded separation (not implausible, 
given the complexity of Israeli Arab identity)?  Doctrinally, there would be no change, 
but objections about real risk and right of option would collapse, and all that would be 
left is the core of Shany’s argument: dividing a polity is simply a per se harm.
22 Since Lieberman is a relatively recent immigrant, this might be a pleasingly 
ironic solution.  But of course this does not satisfy nearly so well for the sabra, for 
whom the contours of coexistence were determined by wars and decisions of state—
including the Law of Return by which Lieberman finds himself in Israel, a citizen.
11
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We should be clear that “giving up,” is, in other terms, simply 
the reconstitution of political units to accord more closely with their 
members’ desires. Why is this so threatening?  The insistence that 
borders cannot be changed by the minority, the majority, or anyone 
unless everyone agrees, reveals a kind of atavistic commitment to the 
state—and this is a curious commitment to find in a cosmopolitan
argument.  Somehow, a project of civic identity has transmuted into 
fetishization of the particular civic identities we happen to have. 
Cosmopolitanism was not supposed to end in the strangulation of 
political choice; it was certainly not supposed to end in the apotheosis 
of the state.  But this is where Shany, and those who think this way, 
have arrived: at the conflation of human rights with citizenship; at the
absolute defense of borders as inviolate normative commitments; at the 
insistence that, where there is dissatisfaction with a civic community, 
the only solution is to lock it in.
And there is something else: It turns out Shany actually accepts 
the idea of ethnic self-determination, so long as it happens in the past. 
For Shany, communities enjoy a constitutional moment in which self-
determination is perfected; such a moment happened at the creation of 
Israel.  This view, which justifies Israel as an act of self-determination,
but then forever closes that opportunity—to the Palestinians within the 
state; to the Palestinians under occupation;23 to the Palestinians who 
missed the moment because they had become refugees; to the Jews 
themselves—reveals a feature that, one would think, cosmopolitanism 
would not demonstrate: not simply how harsh, nor how abstract it is, 
but how selective.
. . .
23 Shany says the Plan offends because it “interfere[s] with the external boundaries 
and the demographic makeup of the State of Israel and the nascent Palestinian polity—
that is, tampering with the territorial integrity of both states.”  Shany, supra note 1, 
at 297.  Presumably, this implies Israel’s abandonment of all claims in the occupied 
territories, including East Jerusalem, and evacuation of all settlers.  I do not know his 
actual view. 
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Perhaps I am wrong about the Lieberman Plan.  It is troubling 
to imagine these scraps of land forced into Palestine against the 
inhabitants’ will—complex as that “will” is—just as it is troubling 
to imagine peoples forced to live together even though, for complex 
reasons, they no longer wish to.  This hardly would be an interesting 
case if it were not a hard one; it is entirely possible that, on this or that 
doctrinal point, Shany is right about the Plan crossing lines, violating 
rights, failing tests. 
But what makes the Plan so intriguing as a case is precisely that it 
invokes that rare thing: a claim by the majority to divide the state.  It is 
this majoritarian element that allows us to explore the contours of the 
forbidden logic of self-determination.  The reconceptualization of self-
determination I describe is an attempt to develop a normative response 
to claims of identity and community, and to the evident strains they 
can create within a polity.
I think the Lieberman Plan presents a profoundly disturbing case. 
But my stated point and purpose are to consider the Plan as an instance 
of a more general phenomenon, and I see no reasoned objection to 
transfers in general.  Indeed, for all he says, Shany all but agrees this 
kind of thing can happen, and does.  He does not like it—more than his 
specific objections, his sensibility makes this clear—but why exactly? 
Clearly he is concerned to protect human rights—and this out of the 
most liberal instincts—but his response is to identify the rights of 
individuals in a way that places a nearly absolute priority on the state 
itself.  We may argue about a particular case—we might even agree—
but where defense of rights becomes, in effect, defense of the state, 
we must ask ourselves: Is there a right to maintain a political union 
against the wishes of those who share it?  Do we wish to defend that?
13
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